By James B. Freeman
Whilst, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of a controversy? what's the right criterion of premise acceptability? delivering a finished idea of premise acceptability, this booklet solutions those questions from an epistemological procedure that the writer calls "common feel foundationalism". His paintings may be of curiosity to experts in casual common sense, severe considering and argumentation concept in addition to to a broader diversity of philosophers and people educating rhetoric.
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Additional info for Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem
At each moment the task is to meet the challenges that are being made at this time. Therefore, as long as some premise remains unchallenged it need not be justiﬁed” (1971, p. 164). An unchallenged premise is acceptable until or unless it is challenged. We may agree that this is what acceptability means from the proponent’s point of view. But when we ask whether a premise is acceptable, we are not in general asking that question of a premise in an argument we are putting forward. Rather, we are asking that of a premise in an argument with which we are confronted.
36–37). )” (1988, p. 2 Richard Whatley also in effect recognizes a presumption for common knowledge. He speaks of presumption against paradox. e.
We may agree that this is what acceptability means from the proponent’s point of view. But when we ask whether a premise is acceptable, we are not in general asking that question of a premise in an argument we are putting forward. Rather, we are asking that of a premise in an argument with which we are confronted. This is a situation in which we are placed in the challenger or adjudicator role. Now the question of whether this premise should be challenged arises. When does a signiﬁcant issue of burden of proof underwrite a demand for justiﬁcation and when would such a demand be frivolous?