By Jussi Haukioja, James R. Beebe
Should philosophy of language use experimental tools, or can it's pursued within the armchair? Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language represents a balanced number of positions in this largely mentioned query.
In the 1st selection of its type, prime specialists within the box current a couple of various views at the relevance of experimental equipment in philosophy of language, starting from whole dismissals of conventional the way to defences of armchair techniques. in addition to exploring attainable novel experimental thoughts, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language evaluates the philosophical relevance of latest experimental effects and provides new facts from new experimental experiences. For students trying to remain prior to the most recent advancements and traits within the philosophy of language, this significant contribution to the sector brings the reader up-to-date.
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I shall consider the task of gathering this evidence in Section 6. But first we need to clarify this contrast between indirect and direct evidence by distinguishing different sorts of intuitions. And we need to say something about the likelihood that intuitions, particularly referential intuitions, are reliable. All this requires distinguishing among intuitions according to the degree to which they are theory laden and according to the expertise of those who have them. 5. 1 Perceptual judgements as intuitions After introducing the Modest Explanation of intuitions in Ignorance of Language, I immediately make a clarification: It may be that there are many unreflective empirical responses that we would not ordinarily call intuitions: one thinks immediately of perceptual judgements like “That grass is brown” made on observing some scorched grass, or “That person is angry” made on observing someone exhibiting many signs of rage.
Kripke’s Gödel Case 27 7 Strictly speaking, speakers can go wrong in uttering “Peano discovered the axioms of number theory”, even if descriptivism about reference is true. It could turn out that no one discovered the axioms of number theory. That possibility also shows that Kripke’s example sentence does not express a trivial truth, even if descriptivism about meaning is true. This means only that the wrong example sentences have been chosen; the underlying point still holds. ” On meaning descriptivism, this sentence is trivially true, while, in fact, it is false.
Also, consider Kripke’s explicit definition: A notion has intuitive content when it means something to the ordinary man. I take it that that – meaning something to the ordinary man – comes to something along the lines of being present in the thought and talk of ordinary people. According to Kripke, the ‘usual argument’16 Kripke’s Gödel Case 23 for scepticism about de re modality hinges on the idea that de re modal notions are philosophical fictions, ‘made up by some bad philosopher’. Against this, Kripke, argues that, no, ordinary people speak and think in de re modal terms: Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, “That’s the guy who might have lost”.